brownlegal

Who is Mike Brown?

Fri, 03 Nov 2006 07:17:39 GMT

ABUSE CAN BE STOPPED

Sun, 29 Oct 2006 01:54:07 GMT

10-28-06

Half a century ago men and boys were taught that women were the "weaker vessel," that they were to be treated with kindness and consideration, that they were to be protected, that they were to be provided for, and that the polite thing to do was hold doors open for them, help then on with their coats, and pull out chairs for them at restaurants.

It isn't the same world today in the twenty-first century.
The Women's Liberation movement that blossomed in the 1970s informed women that they were equal to men and should demand to be treated the same in every aspect of their lives. Unfortunately, it also taught a lot of men the same thing. Men started treating women like they often treat other men, with physical violence.

The situation has become so bad that today more than one out of three women has been or is being abused. Unofficially, the percentages may be much higher than what we see in the media. A lot of domestic abuse simply isn't reported, with good reason. The court system hasn't worked for them.

A woman may call 911 to report that her husband is using her for a punching bag. The police come, normally after they have finished whatever else they are doing. Their attitude is usually one of bored indifference.

The abused woman may then file a formal complaint. The district attorney may then do something with her complaint. More often than not, such complaints find themselves at the bottom of the pile. Seldom is anything done.

The same abused woman may then apply for a TRO, or Temporary Restraining Order. It may or may not be granted. If it is, and the man involved doesn't pay attention to it and the courts don't do anything about it, the woman is now subjected to more abuse by the man who beat her up in the first place. If there are children involved, she will often stay in the home and take more beatings in order to protect them.
There are solutions. No woman has to endure abuse. The courts can be made to work, sometimes more effectively than you can possible imagine. Let me give you an example.

Over ten years ago a woman in Iowa called me and asked for my help. She had read my book, Brown's Lawsuit Cookbook: How to Sue and Win, and figured I might know what I was doing. The problem was, the book didn't cover her particular situation. Her situation was a little unusual.

She was married to an overweight slob who hurt her on a regular basis. He had given her a concussion, broken her fingers, and cut her with a knife. She had the medical records to prove it.

The wrinkle on this case was that they had a seven-year-old daughter that the husband kept pretending to put in jeopardy. The little girl would be playing behind his truck in their driveway. He would get in his truck, gun the engine, and act like he was going to back over her. His abused wife would then fly down the stairs to rescue their little girl. This was but one example.
One day she went through the drawers in his office and found a series of articles describing how to make a wife commit suicide. That's when she called me.
One of the things she told me was that frequently when her husband got off the phone with his ex-wife, he would then immediately start beating her up. Had it not been for her attempting to protect their little girl, she told me she would have left him the second year they were married. She was terrified to divorce him and take a chance on him hurting their little girl.
What I did then was show her how to draw up a ten-count lawsuit for assault and battery, which she did. She added the ex-wife as a co-defendant for instigating some of her beatings.

She then took a copy of her typed lawsuit down to her husband's office, before she filed it in court. She told him she was going to sue him if he didn't give her a divorce and full custody of their daughter, with no visitation rights on his part.

He hitched up his pants and told her, in no uncertain terms, that he couldn't be intimidated. She then handed him a copy of her yet-to-be-filed lawsuit.
He read it to about halfway down the second page. He then went to the bathroom. He threw up. He came back, handed the lawsuit to her, and said, "I'll give you anything you want."
There is an old saying, "The best cases never go to court." This one didn't have to. It worked.
Any woman with normal intelligence can learn how to do this without paying an attorney. Any given legal situation boils down to three things: facts, law, and procedure.

First, you write down what actually happened. If you have exhibits, such as hospital records and police reports, so much the better. Affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives are also helpful.

Second, you look up the law. How to look up the law as it applies to your particular legal situation requires less than three hours of training. It's an indexing system, very similar to (and not much more complicated than) the Dewey Decimal System you learned in fourth grade to locate a book in the library.
Third, the rest of it is just procedure, or how you get it through the court system, which takes only a few more hours to learn. That is, in one weekend, an abused woman can learn to drag her abuser through the court system and make his life both expensive and miserable.

Should Liberals Care About the Second Amendment

Sat, 21 Oct 2006 04:21:57 GMT

10-20-06

SECOND AMENDMENT

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
As this booklet goes to press the most important Second Amendment case of the 21st century
may be unfolding.

What follows is an ad slated for the Shotgun News:

Are Federal Judges the Enemies of the Second Amendment?
...and what you can do about it and them
In the recent case of United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) a federal circuit
court of appeals finally recognized that the Second Amendment was an individual right.
Previously all the federal courts of appeals, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in New Orleans, had held that the Second Amendment was a "collective" right that only
applied to the National Guard, the Highway Patrol, and the like.

I.e., federal judges simply rewrote the Second Amendment to suit their own personal
predilections through a process we call "judicial activism," more accurately known as "judicial
construction" (the rewriting of constitutional provisions by changing the meanings of words).
One of the reasons judges, especially federal judges, behave so badly is that they really
believe they are accountable to no one. At the moment, that appears to be true. When you write
to your Congressmen and ask him to rein one of these characters in his usual excuse is, "There is
nothing I can do because of separation of powers."
Not true. The words "separation of powers" are found nowhere in the Constitution. Those
words are directly contradicted by Article I, section 2, clause 5:

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other Officers; and shall
have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Those words are further contradicted by Article III, section 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Note that Congress created all the federal courts under the Supreme Court. What Congress
can create, Congress can control or, for that matter, dissolve.

Congress also has the power to regulate what the Supreme Court may or may not do. See
Article III, section 2.

The Supreme Court refused to hear the Emerson case, with good reason. Note the "fly in the
ointment" in the Emerson case:
Although, as we have held, the Second Amendment does protect individual rights, that
does not mean that those rights may never be made subject to any limited, narrowly
tailored specific exceptions or restrictions for particular cases that are reasonable and not

inconsistent with the right of Americans generally to individually keep and bear their
private arms as historically understood in this country.

The question never raised in the Emerson case is this: where or by what authority did the
Congress or the courts obtain the right to impose "reasonable restrictions" on the Second
Amendment?

Congress cannot, merely by legislation, amend the Constitution.

[Congress] . . . is not given power by itself . . . to amend the Constitution. Myers. v. United
States, 47 S.Ct. 21, 37 (1926).
Congress [may not] change the meaning of the Constitution through the passage of ordinary
legislation. In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 1998).

The Constitution can only be amended by the people through referendum. See Article V.

Does Congress have the authority to impose "reasonable restrictions" on the First
Amendment, freedom of the press? The liberal media would certainly howl if that happened.
There are ways, once and for all, to take the Second Amendment out of the hands of corrupt
and incompetent federal judges. Last year the United States Supreme Court adjudicated a case
titled Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004). The majority addressed original intent of
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by starting in 1791 and quoting 200 years of
previous history in order to illustrate "original intent."

Were the Crawford standard applied to the Second Amendment every single federal anti-gun
statute would have to be held unconstitutional. There are ways to make this happen.
First, write to your Congressmen and demand that he introduce legislation that, every time a
federal court addresses a constitutional issue, it must address and follow the original intent of
those who authored the Constitutional provision.
Second, every time a federal judge tramples upon the rights of an American citizen, demand
that he bring a Bill of Impeachment against that judge. Gerald Ford, when he was a
Congressmen from Michigan in 1969, scraped Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas off the bench
with that procedure—it didn't even go to a vote on the House Floor.

Terrance R. Willaman tried to raise a Second Amendment defense in his trial in Pennsylvania
for possession of a 9 mm sub-machinegun. Federal judge Maurice B. Cohill threatened
Willaman with contempt of court if he even mentioned the Second Amendment.
If Cohill, a 75-year-old dinosaur who thinks he is above the Second Amendment rights of

citizens, were to be impeached, tried, convicted, and lose his pension for his misbehavior, the
rest of the federal judiciary might then understand that "good behavior" (see Article III) does not
mean "life tenure."

The Willaman case is now in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia.
Predictably, three arrogant and incompetent federal appeals court judges will ignore the Second
Amendment and uphold Willaman's conviction.
However, once Willaman is "tanked" by what many litigants refer to as the "Third Circus,"
Willaman can then appeal for certiorari (discretionary review) to the United States Supreme
Court. If the Supreme Court accepts his case and applies the Crawford standard of original
intent, all of us will get all of our rights under the Second Amendment back, including the right
to own a howitzer if you so choose.
Write to your Congressmen and demand that he introduce legislation to mandate that the
Supreme Court hear all Constitutional issues, which was once the law, and apply the Crawford
standard of original intent in every case.
The problem for gun-lovers has been compounded by the gun organizations themselves.

Should the Second Amendment be restored in its entirety tomorrow, those organizations would
start losing dues paying members the day after.
To use an analogy, we had a fuel crunch in 1979. The Tennessee Gasohol Commission had
16,000 members. The fuel crunch ended in 1980. After it ended, the Tennessee Gasohol
Commission had four (4) members.

To cite a specific example of how the "gun rights" organizations actually operate, consider
the case of Bradford Metcalf and Randy Graham. The two of them were indicted for
"conspiracy" and "possession of machineguns." See case no. 1:98-CR-54 in the United States
District Court, Western District of Michigan, Southern Division. What they had were not
machineguns. The right sideplates (which are the registerable parts that make a Browning
machinegun) were missing. None of the weapons were demonstrated firing to the jury, even on
video. That's because they couldn't fire.
Metcalf was convicted of the "possession" charge; Graham beat that part of the indictment.
Federal district judge Richard Alan Enslen sentenced Metcalf and Graham in open court to 40
and 50 years respectively, telling Graham in open court that he imposed the draconian sentence
because Graham wouldn't plea bargain.

The two of them got the usual dishonesty in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions
signed, not by three federal judges, but the court clerk.

When I explained this situation to the head of one of the larger "gun rights" organizations, he
agreed to help.
He didn't.

When a friend of mine explained to this same man that the Metcalf and Graham case might
be the most important Second Amendment case of the twentieth century, he agreed to help
(again).

He didn't.

When another friend of mine wrote to him and asked him about helping with the Metcalf and
Graham case, his organization "didn't have the money." No one had asked him for any.
When still another friend of mine wrote him and asked about the Metcalf and Graham case,
he stated that he and his organization "had been involved from the beginning."

He hadn't.

The Metcalf and Graham story is in the Criminal Defendants Bible, written by this same
author, along with an extensive discussion of the Second Amendment, how to fight your own
criminal case without a lawyer, and more.

THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO CONTROL THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

Tue, 17 Oct 2006 00:52:38 GMT

10/16/2006

Congress has the authority to overrule wrongly decided cases. Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 901 (5th Cir. 1995). Congress may cure any error made by the courts. Fast v. School Dist. of City of Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Congress has the power to counter judicial doctrine. Belgard v. State of Hawaii, 883 F.Supp. 510, 514 (D. Hawaii 1995).
At least, that is what federal judges themselves tell us. These same judges make much of separation-of-powers." The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one Branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached upon branch approves the encroachment. New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2431 (1992). Notice that this judicial doctrine--for that is all it is, the words and even the concept of separation-of-powers" appear nowhere in the U.S. Constitution or even statutes enacted by Congress--applies only when the judiciary feels threatened by other branches of government. Federal judges ignore their own doctrine when judicial legislation is the object (the words "judicial legislation" appear in William Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973).

The absurd idea that maintains that the federal judiciary is one of the three "co-equal" branches of government and cannot be disciplined by Congress is easily disproved.

First, Congress ordains and establishes courts inferior to the Supreme Court, as it did in 1891 with the federal circuit courts of appeal. I.e., Congress created this mess. Congress can just as easily dissolve it. See Article III, section 1.

Second, judges hold their offices during good behavior. Who determines that good behavior? Any individual member of Congress does, objecting to the judge's behavior by a Bill of Impeachment, as then-Congressman Gerald Ford did in 1969 when he caused Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas to resign.
Third, has anyone noticed that a judge cannot bring a Bill of Impeachment against a Congressman? All a judge can do is cause problems for a Congressman if--and only if--the Congressman is indicted by a member of the Executive Branch first.

On Lawyers in America...

Wed, 11 Oct 2006 21:50:34 GMT

10/11/2006

http://www.members.aol.com/rommellaw

Erwin Rommel School Of Law Challenge:

1. Read the 11th Chapter of the Gospel of Luke.

2. Americans appearing in American courts represented by licensed lawyers are known to be "wards-of-the-court". See, e.g., Corpus Juris Secundum, Attorney & Client, Sec. 2, pg 769.

Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed., 1991) defines "wards-of-the-court" as "infants" or "persons of unsound mind". You could "look it up". Your lawyer didn't explain this to you when he took your money? Wonder why?

3. "His [the attorney's] first duty is to the court, not to the client, and wherever the duties he owes to the client conflict with the duties he owes to the court, as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the former must yield to the latter". Corpus Juris Secundum, Attorney & Client, Sec. 4, pg 802. [emphasis mine.] Your lawyer didn't explain this to you either?

4. In the Oxford English Dictionary [600,000+ entries in 22 volumes], look up "lawyer" & "liar". After you learn why those words are connected phonetically in English,

Re-read Luke 11.

5. Any questions?

The Ninth Circus...

Wed, 04 Oct 2006 21:15:30 GMT

10/04/2006

Archive

NINTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT: Contradictory, Confusing, and in Conflict with the Constitution, Acts of Congress, and the rights of the Common People.

(presented by Michael H. Brown)

Whatever else defines a successful judicial system, one dimension of its success is its ability to deliver consistent rulings in cases that appear to be the same. Lessig,(1) Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, Supreme Court Review 125, 170-171 (1995).

By that yardstick, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is an abject failure. Other circuits quite often disagree with each other. The Ninth Circuit is the only Circuit Court of Appeals that disagrees with itself.

Whereas examples of Ninth Circuit contradictory published opinions are legion (unpublished opinions in this Circuit are far worse) a few of the more glaring examples deserve exposure and discussion.

There are two ways to adjudicate a case:

Let justice be done though the heavens fall.

Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burrow's Reports 2527, 2562 (1768).

Or :

It is not the technical legal conception that leads to the decisions pronounced by the judge, but it is the decision which the judge intends to pronounce which lead him to the finding of the technical reasons therefor--the decisions themselves being the result of the judge's views on the social and economic questions involved in the solution of the apparently abstract constitutional problems.

Louis B. Boudin, Government by Judiciary, Volume I, page 338 (1932).

The latter procedure is routinely followed by federal judges in the Ninth Circuit, aided by contradictory case law.

Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities. Immunity does not extend, however, to actions for prospective injunctive relief.

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)(citations omitted).

An appellate court decision can only be overturned through an en banc hearing.

Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 1994).

Ashelman was an en banc decision. That is, according to Ninth Circuit published opinions, only another en banc decision should be able to over-rule Ashelman.

Mullis v. U. S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1987) was not an en banc hearing and was rendered the year after Ashelman. On page 1394 of Mullis the Ninth Circuit held that, "The judicial or quasi-judicial immunity available to federal officers is not limited to immunity from damages, but extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief."

As the dissenting judge in Mullis pointed out, "To extrapolate from Pulliam(2)

a rule which broadly discriminates between federal and state judges in the judicial immunity field is at best unwarranted and at worse potentially divisive to the goal of harmony in the administration of the American judicial system." Mullis at 1395.

"Extrapolate" is too polite a word. As the previous paragraph in the dissent makes clear, what actually happened was the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the United States Supreme Court. Only the Supreme Court is supposed to have the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. See Florida League of Professional Lobbyists v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996).

As late as October 21, 1991 the United States Supreme Court recognized that a judge is not immune from criminal liability or from a suit for prospective injunctive relief. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286, 287 note 1 (1991).

Mireles is quoted in Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) and then overruled by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on pages 1243-44 of Moore, citing Mullis, supra.

The daily application of such contradictory case law allows federal judges in the Ninth Circuit to simply overlook almost any declaratory and injunctive relief actions directed against misbehaving lower court judges, including state(3)

judges by extrapolation. I.e., federal and state judges in the Ninth Circuit are "above the law" depending upon which appellate panel they draw.

Ninth Circuit cases concerning federal criminal law are even more unprincipled.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are a comprehensive set of rules of pleading, practice, and procedure for federal criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court has been given authority by statute to prescribe such rules and present them to the Congress for examination. The proposed rules take effect 90 days later, unless Congress, by legislation, delays their implementation and/or amends them. Once put into effect, the Federal Rules have the force of law. See 18 U.S.C. 3771 (1982). See also Hungate, Changes in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 61 A.B.A.J. 1203 (1975).

[A] district court has no authority to depart from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. McVeigh, 931 F.Supp. 753, 755 (D.Colo. 1996) quoting Carlisle v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 1461 (1996).

Judges are not empowered to formulate procedural rules not specifically contemplated by Congress or the Constitution. United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 1991).

Which is exactly what the defendant federal judges of the Ninth Circuit have done in thousands upon thousands of federal criminal cases.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 (f)
Finding and Return of Indictment.

An indictment may be found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors. The indictment shall be returned by the grand jury to a federal magistrate judge in open court. If a complaint or information is pending against the defendant and 12 jurors do not concur in finding an indictment, the foreperson shall so report to a federal magistrate judge in writing forthwith.

"Nothing suggests that the grand jury would not have returned the indictment in open court . . ." United States v. McChristian, 47 F.3d 1499, 1540 (9th Cir. 1995).

28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Federal custody remedies on motion attacking sentence

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

If Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(f) is a law, then, under this criteria, every single federal prisoner sentenced in every single federal district court in the Ninth Circuit for at least the last ten years is legally entitled to have his or her conviction vacated.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began the confusion years before with its statement in United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1983):

Future cases may well face us in a different posture. The government is on notice that this court will not brook behavior that degrades the grand jury into a rubber stamp, and the testing of the prosecutor's evidence into an empty ritual.

The very purpose of the requirement that a man be indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge . . . .

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19, 4 L.Ed.2d 252, 80 S.Ct. 270 (1960) (footnote omitted), quoted in United States v. Samango, supra, 607 F.2d at 884.

The many earnest and discerning questions of this grand jury manifest the vitality of this ancient institution. Prosecutors owe it respect, not condescension, manipulation, or substituted judgment.

We have no wish to hinder the sound exercise of the broad discretion prosecutors must have to execute their law enforcement duties. They enjoy great latitude in selecting evidence, witnesses, and methods of presentation for the grand jury.

But their great power carries a concomitant responsibility. When a summary procedure is combined with overbearing tactics and misleading instructions, the grand jury as a screening device at some point becomes a nullity.

Which, statistically speaking, is precisely what the grand jury has become (as the number of "No True Bills" have become so insignificant they are no longer reported(4)

):

Number of Federal
Grand Jury Proceedings
Fiscal
Year Number of
Federal
Indictments No True Bills Total Federal Grand
Jury Proceedings S. Calif. Hawaii
1976 23,612 123 (0.518%) 23,735
1977 21,412 119 (0.553%) 21,531
1978 19,405 104 (0.533%) 19,509
1979 16,356 90 (0.547%) 16,446
1980 16,507 85 (0.512%) 16,592 455 66
1981 16,699 95 (0.566%) 16,794 687 39
1982 16,989 75 (0.440%) 17,064 487 40
1983 17,702 63 (0.355%) 17,765 594 102
1984 17,419 68 (0.389%) 17,487 521 156
1985 17,051 43 (0.252%) 17,094 612 97
1986 20,045 66 (0.328%) 20,111 634 128
1987 19,224 39 (0.202%) 19,263 764 92
1988 20,156 28 (0.139%) 20,184 578 73
1989 23,172 31 (0.134%) 23,203 624 99
1990 23,914 11 (0.046%) 23,925 567 93
1991 25,927 16 (0.062%) 25,943 683 119
1992 25,470 1,049 145
1993 23,757 783 84
1994 20,714 647 131
1995 22,856 600 131
1996 23,449 679 143

Justice Scalia, in delivering the opinion of a unanimous Supreme Court, has made mention of the "common-law protection" of the grand jury:

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless upon a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." That does indeed confer a right not to be tried (in the pertinent sense) when there is no grand jury indictment. Undoubtedly, the common-law protections traditionally associated with the grand jury attach to the grand jury are required by this provision-- including the requisite secrecy of grand jury proceedings.

Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 1499-1500 (1989).

One of those common-law protections was having a grand jury indictment returned in open court. Why this is so critical is discussed in Renigar v. United States, 172 F. 646, 650 (4th Cir. 1909) ("It is essential to the validity of an indictment that it be presented in open court and in the presence of the grand jury.").

Other examples of Ninth Circuit confusion would be amusing if it were not for the fact that people's lives, liberty, and property are being destroyed on a daily basis because of it.

Defendant Redondo-Lemos pled guilty to an offense which carries a statutory minimum sentence of 5 years. The district court nevertheless sentenced him to 18 months, based on a finding that the Office of the United States Attorney acted arbitrarily and discriminated on the basis of gender in plea bargaining with this defendant. We must decide whether the district court may so second-guess the United States Attorney's exercise of prosecutorial discretion. We answer unequivocally: yes and no.

United States v. Gilberto, No. 90-10430 (9th Cir. 1992)

My disagreement is with Judge Kozinski's categorical conclusion that there can be no judicial enforcement of the constitutional right of due process with regard to prosecutorial charging decisions. Judge Kozinski indicates that if the prosecutor adopted an office procedure of selecting charges by the throw of a dart or a toss of the coin, such arbitrariness would violate the due process clause. He then concludes, if I read his opinion correctly, that even in such an extreme case there could be no judicial remedy because of considerations of separation of powers.

Id. (Canby, Circuit Judge, concurring).

To which every federal criminal defendant in the Ninth Circuit would concur also.

We review this case en banc to resolve a conflict in our circuit over the proper standard for determining whether an adequate showing has been made by a defendant seeking discovery in connection with a selective prosecution charge. The conflict arises from two cases filed within days of each other that adopted different approaches to this question. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir. 1992) held that the government could be ordered to provide discovery only upon a "prima facie showing that wrongful discrimination is probably taking place." By contrast, United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1992), stated that a prima facie showing was not necessary. Instead, Bourgeois adopted a "colorable basis" test. Id. We conclude that the colorable basis standard better accommodates the competing concerns implicated by discovery in selective prosecution cases.

United States v. Lee, Nos. 93-50031, 93-50057 (9th Cir. 1995).

At least this time the Ninth Circuit did attempt to correct itself. One situation that remains uncorrected began on April 5, 1996, when a Ninth Circuit panel consisting of judges Hall, Noonan, and Shubb, rendered a decision in a case titled Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98. On page 101 those three federal judges held that the Second Amendment only applied to protect the right of the states to keep and maintain armed militia. The same three Ninth Circuit judges then quoted an old U. S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Miller, 59 S.Ct. 816 (1939), to justify their decision.

The problem is that this is not what the Miller case held. That case primarily concerned the use of a sawed-off shotgun as a military weapon. Anyone who can read English can see that the Hickman decision has absolutely no foundation in the Miller case.

A paragraph from the Miller decision bears repeating:

The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline." And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.

Miller at 818.

The confusion of Ninth Circuit judges didn't end with misquoting Supreme Court precedent. What "gives the lie" to the Ninth Circuit decision in Hickman took place on April 11, 1996, in a case titled United States v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 846, on page 850, see note 7. That note holds that, "The Second Amendment embodies the right to defend oneself and one's home against physical attack."

The three judges who authored this opinion then went on to refer the reader to two excellent law journal articles, Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 Alabama Law Review 103 (1987) and Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale Law Journal 687 (1989).

That is, the Second Amendment had one meaning on April 5, 1996 and a completely different meaning on April 11, 1996, a time span of less than a week.

It gets worse. Hickman was a normal taxpaying, law-abiding citizen. The Second Amendment didn't apply to him. It did apply to Steven Gomez, a government informer in a murder-for-hire case.

What's even worse, the three judges who decided the Gomez case were Hall, Kozinski and Hawkins. That is, Cynthia Holcomb Hall, federal appeals court judge sworn to uphold the U. S. Constitution, changed her mind about what that Constitution meant in less than a week.

The Alice-in-Wonderland quality of legal reasoning in the Ninth Circuit has been observed by other federal judges, both in the Circuit and out of it.

Alice-in-Wonderland was a world where words had no meaning, recognized by Supreme Court Justice Harlan in Welch v. United States, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 1803 (1970).

I find the Second Circuit's answer to the "Alice in Wonderland" indictment of this type of abuse of the English language and the plain meaning of words to be unpersuasive. We construe statutes, yes, but we do not redefine words, especially when the redefinition carries important policy implications with it. That is up to the people who write dictionaries or Congress--not judges. The majority opinion calls this a "liberal construction" of the key word and the statute: I respectfully see it as verbal anarchy.

Imel v. Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Northern California, 904 F.2d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990)(dissent).

Actually, the Ninth Circuit does redefine words, such as "militia," "indictment by grand jury," and others, as published opinions prove.

"[T]he task of safeguarding rights of criminal defendants ultimately rests with the experienced men and women who preside in our district courts." United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1491 (9th Cir. 1987).

It is black letter law that grand juries and petit juries are the bodies that are supposed to safeguard the rights of criminal defendants. It is a known fact that "safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants," constitutional or statutory, simply doesn't happen in the Ninth Circuit, as this article illustrates.

A typical comment from a non-Ninth Circuit Court:

[T]he Ninth Circuit's holding effectively obviates a portion of a statute enacted by Congress, with which result this Court respectfully does not agree. United States v. Delgado, 959 F.Supp. 1523, 1528 (S.D.Fla. 1997).

Other Circuits for the most part, follow Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit, in 1996 alone, was reversed in 28 out of 29 cases before the Supreme Court. I.e., if Supreme Court precedent must be followed, the Ninth Circuit is wrong 97% of the time. See Los Angeles Times, Tuesday, August 5, 1997.

Should a new, 12th Circuit, be split off from the existing Ninth Circuit, the last thing the new circuit should do is adopt Ninth Circuit cases as precedent, as the 11th Circuit did in 1981 when it split off from the 5th Circuit.

May I suggest that the new 12th Circuit adopt Supreme Court decisions as precedent instead?

1. 1 Lawrence Lessig is professor of Law at the University of Chicago.

2. 2 Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S.Ct. 1970 (1984)

3. 3 See Okoren v. Symington, United States Court of Appeals No. 96-15981 (9th Cir. 1996), for an example of this.

4. 4 From Statistical Report, United States Attorney's Office, (Fiscal Years 1976 through 1996). Note: Starting in 1992 the Statistical Report ceased to report the number of no true bills, if there were any to report.

Support this Bill it MEANS FREEDOM FOR YOU AND ME!

Sun, 24 Sep 2006 20:45:53 GMT

109th Congress
1st Session
H.R. _____

To amend title 28, United States Code, to establish standards for
impeachment of justices and judges of the United States.

_____________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Akin introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee
on _____________________

_____________________

A BILL

To amend title 28, United States Code, to establish standards for
impeachment of justices and judges of the United States.

1 Be it enacted by tile Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act nay be cited as the Judicial Conduct Act
5 of 2005.

1 SEC. 2. STANDARDS FOR IMPEACHMENT OF JUSTICES AND
2 JUDGES.
3 (a) IN GENERAL. Chapter 16 of title 28, United
4 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol-
5 lowing new section:
6 365. Standards for impeachment
7 (a) CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS.
8 (1) ARTICLE II, SECTION 4. A justice or
9 judge of the United States shall be removed from of-
10 fice on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason,
11 bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors, as
12 provided in Article II, section 4 of the United States
13 Constitution.
14 (2) ARTICLE III, SECTION 4. A justice or
15 judge of the United States shall hold the office dur-
16 ing good behavior as provided in Article III, section
17 1 of the United States Constitution. A justice or
18 judge failing to act during good behavior shall be re-
19 moved from office.
20 (b) DEFINITIONS. In this section:
21 (1) The term treason means levying war
22 against the United States or in adhering to its en-
23 emies, giving them aid and comfort.
24 (2) The term bribery means offering, giving,
25 receiving, or soliciting something of value for the

1 purpose of influencing the action of an official in the
2 discharge of his or her public or legal duties.
3 (3) The term other high crimes and mis-
4 demeanors means, with respect to a justice or
5 judge, any act of misbehavior or misconduct by such
6 justice or judge, which evidences an unfitness for the
7 bench, including, but not limited to, the following:
8 (A) Any criminal offense punishable by
9 death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
10 year.
11 (B) Usurpation of power.
12 (C) Unblushing or notorious partiality or
13 favoritism.
14 (D) Indolence or neglect.
15 (E) Disgraceful or indecent behavior.
16 (F) Incivility, rudeness, or insolence to-
17 ward counsel, litigants, or witnesses.
18 (G) Using the office for personal ends.
19 (H) Entering or enforcement of orders and
20 decisions beyond the jurisdiction of the
21 court in which the justice or judge serves.
22 (I) Entering or enforcement of orders and
23 decisions based on judgments, laws, agree-
24 ments, or pronouncements of foreign institu-

1 tions, governments, or multilateral organiza-
2 tions.
3 (J) Entering or enforcement of orders
4 and decisions in contradiction of the original
5 understanding of the United States Constitu-
6 tion.
7 (K) Entering or enforcement of orders
8 and decisions based on precedent from previous
9 Federal court decisions that conflicts or is in-
10 consistent with the text of the United States
11 Constitution.
12 (4) The term failing to act during good be-
13 havior includes committing an act of treason, brib-
14 ery, or any of the other high crimes and mis-
15 demeanors.
16 (5) The term original understanding of the
17 United States Constitution means, with respect to a
18 justice or judge, that such justice or judge should be
19 guided, in applying a provision of the Constitution,
20 by the principles that the ratifiers of that provision
21 understood themselves to be enacting.
22 (c) PRECEDENCE PRESERVED.—Nothing in this
23 section shall be construed to limit or replace a basis for
24 impeachment accepted before the enactment of this sec-
25 tion.

1 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sec-
2 tions for chapter 16 of title e8, United States Code, is
3 amended by adding at the end the following new item:
365. Standards for impeachment.

PUBLIC DENIED HEARING AT PUBLIC HEARING

Tue, 29 Aug 2006 01:06:58 GMT

08/28/2006

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 3, 1998 Chicago, Illinois

PUBLIC DENIED HEARING AT PUBLIC HEARING

Appellate Judge stops invited member of the public from speaking to the Commission on the Structural Alternative for the U.S. Courts of Appeal Chicago "Public Hearing".

Marshals secure room and bar the public's re-entry. Visibly shaken judges make hasty exit to "security area". Justin Garriott, reporting

On April 3, 1998, at a "public hearing" in Chicago, a panel of appellate judges meeting with the public about ways to improve the Appellate Courts heard more than it was ready or willing to hear. After reminding the panel of Senator Joseph Biden's remark in 1990 that "the courtroom doors are closed to the American public", Chicago pro se Peter Jon Simpson told the judges that those doors "are now permanently welded shut". In a often scathing report which he was invited to deliver, Simpson attempted to relate several cases of blatant intellectual dishonesty, judicial misconduct, perjury, and obstruction of justice that, named numerous federal judges in several districts currently on the bench. Simpson's message was so unsettling and unwelcome that the judges were visibly unnerved and Judge Gilbert Merritt ultimately cut Mr. Simpson off, "recessing" a public hearing then barely two hours old.

Apparently the message frightened them as well. One minute into Simpson's remarks, a federal marshal left the room, returning with five more. The marshals moved closer to Simpson when he asked Judge Merritt why he couldn't extend his remarks, when licensed attorneys were allowed to extend theirs. Judge Merritt and his associates, Judge Rymer, U. Virginia law professor Daniel Meador and a staff member exited quickly after denying this member of "the public" a hearing at this allegedly "public hearing". While in recess, the marshals told Simpson, his family and this reporter to "take it out into the hall". When all immediately complied with that order, the Marshals stood in front of the doors, preventing re-entry.

Judge Merritt promised the full text of Mr. Simpson's remarks would be posted on the Commissions website. Said Mr. Simpson later, "It will probably be an air-conditioned day in Hell before that happens". "We the people" shall soon see, even though "We the people" cannot be heard. Mr. Simpson's complete presentation follows.

--30--
Address to the Commission on the Structural Alternatives for the Courts of Appeal @ Chicago, April 3, 1998,

Peter Jon Simpson
Christian Legal Education Association & Research
4842 N Magnolia
Chicago 60640-4710
773- 878- 0681 voice
0682 fax

rommellaw@aol.com
members.aol.com/rommellaw

I am Peter Jon Simpson, an American with firsthand knowledge of the Federal Judiciary today. Thank you for your invitation. Restructuring the Appellate Courts involves 3 questions:

1) What does a non-lawyer litigant in America have to do to get his case read by a judge who understands the law and a Constitutional question before him?

2) What does a non-lawyer litigant in America have to do to get his Appeal placed before a panel of judges who will

a) read it and who
b) understands the law and the Constitutional question before them?

3) What do Americans have to do to experience good, old fashioned legal reform?

History notes in 1066 William The Conqueror landed in England, burned his ships behind him and lost half his army in the 1st battle he fought. He conquered England anyway. Why? Because as the retreating English King sent for the people to come to the defense of the King & the fatherland, the people refused his call.

Why? They ignored the invasion of their own country because the corrupt federal judges of their day had reduced them to slaves on the land. There were 2 set of rules, one for the King's cronies, another for the people. The people, facing a legal system that worked solely for the benefit of the privileged elite, stood by as the invaders marched.

Do you know why many today would not lift a finger if an enemy came to these shores and threatened you members of this panel, your cronies, and the silk-stocking lawyers and judges that surround me in this room? Do you know why many would pray for the success of the invaders? Do you know why many disenfranchised Americans would actually help the invaders, hoping for a better deal from our enemy than the deal they've received from the corrupt and reprehensible reprobates who parade as federal judges today?

In the legislative history of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Senator Joseph Biden remarked "... the courthouse door is closed to the American people". Believe me, it is now permanently welded shut. I am the living embodiment of that. Can any of you explain why today, non-lawyers like me who study and raise constitutional questions in Federal courts, are laughed at, ignored or worse?

Kilgore wrote in Judicial Tyranny, "Tyranny cannot come to America until judges become intellectually dishonest".

In 1991 my daughter was removed from my home at gunpoint, without any court process whatsoever as required by state law. She was then assaulted and sexually molested by government bureaucrats and their agents.

Ignoring a direct warning of the United States Supreme Court, I foolishly appealed to justice, filing a Federal Civil Rights Lawsuit. It was summarily dismissed after 58 docket entries in 60 days. I have waited over 7 years for my constitutionally guaranteed "day in court". I am still waiting.

Mr. Justice White, can you explain to me how I get my $120 filing fee back. I paid for trial by impartial jury, not summary dismissal.

I drew Federal Judge Scott O Wright, known in Missouri as "Judge Scott All Wrong", the District's Chief Judge. He has risen to his level of incompetence. Scott All Wrong is as intellectually dishonest as the worst of despots.

Can any of you learned judges explain to me why Judge Wrong has done absolutely everything in his power to keep me from bringing those who molested my daughter to trial? Absolutely everything?

Can any of you learned judges explain to me why the Federal Prosecutors laughed in my face when I asked for a grand jury investigation of the crimes visited on my then innocent three year old daughter?

Please, save your suggestions about hiring a lawyer for someone who knows less than I do about our "caste-system legal system".

Can any of you learned judges explain to me why no lawyer-- not one-- dared lift a finger to help me? They all told my father as he waived his checkbook at them, "we wouldn't touch this case with a 10 foot pole".

Mr. Justice White, can you explain to me how I can get my daughter's innocence back? Can you please tell me how I can stop the nightmares from waking her, how I can make her not flinch whenever she sees a cop?

My 1st go at the 8th Circus Court of Appeals won a summary reversal. Since then, the 8th Circus judges have gone out of their way to deny me relief unless & until I surrender my daughter to the very bureaucrats who assaulted & molested her. Can any of you learned judges explain this to me?

This panel has already learned live & firsthand that in the 11th Circus no pro se petition ever reaches a judge's desk. Those opinions are decided and written by clerks or staff lawyers. From my experience, the same is true in every Appellate Circuit. Can any of you learned judges explain to me why?
Is this what we the people pay federal judges $100,000+ per annum, plus perks to do? Is this what passes for "intellectual honesty" in the Federal Appellate Courts these days? Can any of you learned judges explain any of this to me?

An eyewitness to this commission's Atlanta March 23rd meeting wrote me:

"Peggy did a fine job during the Commission Hearing. I sat in the back and
observed Senior Judge Hatchett who sat in the back mid section. He
started freaking out, looking back at the U.S. Marshall, not once or twice
but times. When Peggy mentioned the thousands of 372 Complaints, he
got up and called in extra U.S. Marshals. I JOKE NOT. By the time the
Marshals arrived, the hearing was adjourned."

Can any of you learned judges explain to me why this distinguished panel does not possess the integrity to place a true and exact copy of Peggy Dadic's complete remarks from that hearing on its web-site? Will my remarks appear?

Is this panel aware of the revelations surrounding 7 U.S. Supreme Court receiving expensive trips & cash honoraria from West Publishing Co. while West litigated in actions before that Supreme Court? I have seen nothing from N Lee Cooper, Esq. or his private country-club American Bar Association about such conduct, conduct that would make the most depraved South American Dictator blush. Can any of you learned judges explain why? Is Mr. Cooper too busy?

The Minneapolis Star-Tribune and the American Spectator magazine had the integrity at the time to publish the facts. Did Mr. Cooper miss those reports because they're hard to read through the cigar-smoke in the back rooms where most cases are decided and "the fix" is arranged?

Do you members of this Commission know what regular Americans, especially non-lawyer litigants, face in these federal courts every day?

The 8th Circus Chief Judge is Richard Arnold. He sits on that alongside his brother Morris Arnold, in willful & premeditated violation of the very law they both swore to uphold, the Anti-Nepotism Statute @ 28 U.S.C §458.

The 8th Circus lies to Congress, falsifying the number of Complaints filed and responds that this is a problem for the legislature. Is it not true that it wouldn't matter anyway, as today's Federal Judiciary simply ignores the Congress with impunity and writes law on its own?

In our "caste-system legal system", like England's in 1066, there are two sets of rules today: one for me and my family and regular Americans, and another set of rules for the privileged elite like Richard and Morris Arnold and the lawyers & judges crowded into this hearing this morning. Can any of you explain to me how & why our magnificent system of constitutional government has degenerated into the nightmare I've been living for over 7 years? Can any of you tell me the last time a federal judge was impeached for trampling the rights of an American?

Let me repeat this for emphasis and clarity-- Richard & Morris Arnold sit in willful, premeditated violation of the very law they swore an oath to uphold. Of course, regular folks like me know that the 745 Federal Judges in America can't be bothered with petty annoyances like having to obey statutes passed by Congress. Those are for peasants like me and my family and millions of other Americans, not our "modern Mandarin" ruling elite like the Arnolds and their privileged friends.

Do you really wonder why lawyers and judges are held in such contempt and derision today? Do you really ponder why respect for the law & the judges who are to impartially administer the law has vanished with nary a trace? May I brazenly suggest to you that you might consider waking up & smelling the coffee?

If you recall, the violation of the judge's oath of office is grounds for impeachment. Henry Hyde & Orrin Hatch have been told by hundreds & hundreds of Americans of the situation regarding the Arnold Brothers in St. Louis at the 8th Circus. Hatch & Hyde just laugh in our faces or worse, they simply ignore us. They're obviously just too busy to be concerned with the affairs of peasants. Can any of you tell me why this is?

Now I want you to understand that I believe Richard Arnold & his brother Morris belong on the bench. They belong on the bench awaiting their turn to use the telephone in the Maximum Security Wing of the Federal Penitentiary @ Marion, Illinois, where they ought to be for suborning perjury, fraud and obstruction of justice. You see, after 23 hours in lock-down, you only get one hour out to use the telephone and you have to wait on the bench for your turn...

Of course, we all know, even if the Arnold Brothers' fraud is exposed and they are removed, they'll keep their fat pensions & their freedoms, remaining members in good standing of the American Bar Association. Can anyone tell me why? Do you think per chance Mr. Cooper will explain to us how the corrupt do always seem to find a way of protecting their own?

In the last year, the number of 28 U.S.C. §372(c)(1) Complaints For Judicial Misconduct against the egregious conduct I and countless other Americans have experienced in the Federal District & Appellate Courts has skyrocketed. Corrupt judges dismiss all 372's, lie to Congress about the number filed and Henry Hyde & Orrin Hatch are too busy playing footsie with the Judiciary to care a whit about those they pretend to serve. Can any of you explain this to me?

Do they refuse to protect the rights of Americans so they wont risk annoying the Federal Judiciary?

We the people create jokes when we are powerless to rectify situations like you have willfully perpetrated upon us. You know what call a lawyer with an IQ of 61? Federal Judge. You know what you call a lawyer with an of 41? Federal Appellate Court Judge.

The Federal Judges' oath of office @ 28 U.S.C. § 453(a) comes to us from ancient precedents. It is found in the Sacred Texts @ DEUTERONOMY 1: 16-17 and LEVITICUS 19: 15. In 1983, Congress codified our national need to study & apply the teachings of the Holy Scriptures in our everyday life. Today, in the hands of judges the likes of Wrong & the Arnold Brothers the Judicial Oath is a cruel joke made on the very people whose taxes pay the six figure salaries of these politically connected ambulance-chasers. Can any of you justify this to me and my family?

Here in the 7th Circus the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, written by lawyers who litigate in this circuit describes the 7th by saying "[I]f there's bad law to be made, they will make it, in terms of being pro-government in criminal cases and pro big-business, or status quo in civil cases". Where in our Constitution does the judiciary obtain its power to make law?

Will Judge Posner explain to all of us why a non-lawyer litigant in the 7th Circuit was sanctioned over $2,000 for raising a constitutional question which the District Court & the 7th refused to address? Mr Justice White, you may read it for yourself. Allegedly, Judge Posner wrote that decision, although the evidence already before this commission suggests that is a bald-faced lie.

Reversing a criminal conviction on Constitutional Law grounds is an exercise in futility for even the most learned & skilled litigator, as the entire 7th Circus panel suffers from 1st degree cognitive dissonance. Can any of you explain to me why 7th Circus judges, like most Federal Judges, either can't read plain English or, if they can read, they don't understand plain English?

Can anyone here explain to me why the 7th, in Briscoe v LaHue, decided that cops intentionally lying under oath are exempt from suit for perjury? Can anyone here explain to me why the Supremes in Briscoe upheld this intentional rewriting of the statutes passed by Congress?

At least one Federal Judge in America has the stones and conscience to agree with me. Read Judge Fong's opinion @ In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 707 F.Supp, 1207, 1215-16 (D. Hawaii 1989).

The Supreme Court, before it went on West Publishing Co.'s gravy train, noted similar abuses in the courts below. Here's their warning that I ignored.

"Sheriffs having eyes to see, see not; judges having ears to hear, hear not;
witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it... all the apparatus and of civil
government away as if government and justice were crimes and feared
detection. Among the most dangerous things an injured can do is to
appeal to justice."

Mitchum v Foster, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2161 (1972)

I know firsthand those dangers. And while the lawyers in this room snicker and the judges on this panel stare off into space, the destruction of our republic by an out-of-control Federal Judiciary, "the Imperial Judiciary" as Jefferson called it, continues apace.

Jefferson's 200 year old warnings ring true today, as the last pro se litigant raped by some ignorant Appellate Panel in this building will explain. There is nothing new under the sun....

Kilgore wrote in Judicial Tyranny, "Tyranny cannot come to America until judges become intellectually dishonest". Honored members of this commission, tyranny is here!!

In closing, I ask you a favor. I'd like you to get us one day before both the Senate & House Judiciary Committees. Just Americans injured by this system. No lawyers. This nation is filled with non-lawyer litigants whose rights are trampled daily by corrupt, intellectually dishonest and morally bankrupt judges. We'd like to give Congress one more opportunity to serve we the people, before America plunges headlong into the anarchy and civil war which always result when corruption replaces justice.

Our "caste-system legal system" only serves to enrich you who operate it. If a citizen, especially a pro se litigant, is treated fairly & justice is served, the system broke down & something went terribly, terribly wrong. I have fought for my rights for over 7 years. I'm not making generalizations, I speak from hard experience. I now realize I have no rights.

Can you explain to me why the Constitution, in the hands corrupt jurists like Scott All Wrong, the Arnold Brothers and most all other Federal Judges, is merely a list
of suggestions, to be considered at the whim and caprice of judges?

If I had a bar ticket; if I belonged to the correct Masonic Lodge, my problem would have been fixed just hours after its inception. Can any of you learned members of this panel explain this to me?

Please permit to leave you with a quote from Samuel Adams to say a short prayer for you all.

"If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquillity of servitude better than
the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in peace. We ask
not your counsels nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which
feed you. May your chains set lightly upon you and may posterity forget
that ye were our countrymen."

And I leave this imprecatory prayer for you:

YHVH, God of Abraham, Isaac & Jacob, God of my forefathers and Creator of the Universe, strike down each and every member of this commission should they shirk their responsibilities to clean up the whorehouse nightmare into which our corrupt legal system has degenerated. If they refuse to heed Psalm 20 & Psalm 58, sweep them from out of this land, they and all their families with them. Show them the exact same mercies that their corrupt cronies show American litigants across this land every day. Remove the memory of them from among us but leave us the memory of their crimes. Let their accursed respect of persons in judgment which they have allowed and aided to creep over America like the stench of death be lifted and cast off into the outer darkness after them. And let YOUR judgment & dealing with them in this life stand as a reminder to the jurists who follow them of the penalty YOU will mete should they also be deluded into violating YOUR STATUTES and our unalienable rights. To those on this panel whose hands are clean, show them YOUR mercy & loving kindness. To those whose corrupt deeds of omission and commission and extra judicial oaths are worked in secret, let their astonished eyes watch as YOU mete out justice that is swift & retribution that is final.

May the choice this commission makes this day honor YHVH and
honor each and every one of you.

Now that I have asked all these questions of you, I'll be pleased to answer your questions of me.

[As my full statement was not permitted, the honored judges had no questions.]

A taste of Erwin Rommel School of Law vol. I

Fri, 25 Aug 2006 05:19:07 GMT

If I were the head of Russia or Red China and wanted a pretext to invade I would certainly have sufficient legal precedent created by our Supreme Court.

ANTONIN SCALIA

Appointed on Sept. 26, 1986 by Ronald Reagan.
This character is supposed to have been a law professor. Stay away from whatever law school where Mr. Scalia taught unless you want to spend your life defending legal malpractice suits.
I'm going to illustrate his incompetence with a mere three (3)
examples:

In United States v Williams. 112 S.Ct. 1735 (1992), an opinion authored by Scalia, it was held that it is perfectly acceptable to hide evidence exonerating the defendant ("exculpatory" evidence) from the Grand Jury members investigating the case.

What Scalia did was sanction the wholesale commission of felonies by federal prosecutors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (concealing of material facts in United States agency proceedings).
Stevens wrote a pretty good dissent, a sentence of which bears repeating:

When the Court appears to favor the Government over the ordinary litigant, it seriously compromises its ability to discharge that important duty (administer justice impartially). United States v Williams (g, 1748-1749.

Or, as Thurgood Marshall pointed out, the Supreme Court grants summary reversals in favor of-wardens or prosecutors 24 out of 27 times. United States v Benchimal. 105 S.Ct. 2103 (1985). Marshall was appointed by President Johnson to the Supreme Court June 13, 1967 (i.e. he was a Democrat).

Marshall's dissents make interesting reading in that they demonstrate unequivocally that he was the next to last Supreme Court justice to actually understand constitutional law (though he "blew it in Roe v Wade). White seemed to be the only one left, with an inkling of how it works. He then retired.

Most of the present bunch dont have a clue.
In I.N.S. v Elias Zacarias. 112 S.Ct. 812 (1992) Scalia held that a Guatemalen native afraid of being forced to join guerillas and equally afraid the government in his home country would retaliate against his family if he did didnt qualify for political asylum. This reversed an Appeals Court decision.

When you are between a rock and a hard place, do not expect any help from the United States Supreme Court.

In Hanhelin v Michigan. Ill S.Ct. 2680 (1991) Scalia opined that a life sentence without possibility of parole for possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine was not a violation of the "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition of the Eighth Amendment.

It was cruel, but not unusual. Extrapolating this nonsense to its logical conclusion, we could say that if the rack, the thumbscrew, the wheel, and other medieval instruments of torture were in every day use they would be cruel, but not unusual.

The Romans, at least, recognized prolonged incarceration as a form of torture. Sometimes I wonder if these "privileged elite" fat yuppie spoiled rich kids on our Supreme Court can recognize the nose on the end of their face. A life sentence without possibility of parole is actually a death sentence: they're just killing you one day at a time.
Byron R. White did a pretty good dissent on this one, starting at page 2709. White points out on page 2417 that Scalia's "REASONING" could result in life imprisonment for a parking ticket.

BYRON R. WHITE
Now retired.

CLARENCE THOMAS
Thomas' dissents speak for themselves. If he is capable of showing an ounce of mercy to criminal defendants, I've never seen it.

PERCURIAM
This means a decision by the whole court. I couldnt let Mireles v Waco. 112, S.Ct. 286 (1991) slide past without a snide remark or two. This case concerned a judge sued because he ordered two police officers to bring an attorney brought before him "with excessive force." They did, yanking him bodily out of another courtroom. The Ninth Circuit thought the attorney should have his "day in court" but the Supreme Court thought otherwise.

Which may explain why a lot of our federal and state judges may some day qualify for the Endangered Species List. There is just so much of the "Rodney King Routine" people are going to take.

this is an excerpt from Erwin Rommel School of Law vol.1
How to Defeat an Illegal Legal System. By Michael H. Brown
availible from members.aol.com/rommellaw or www.michaelhbrown.com
Browns services are availible as a consultant by contacting Peter Jon Simpson at 3208572400

THE NEW NEGROES RETURN OF THE SLAVE TRADE

Sun, 20 Aug 2006 03:57:43 GMT

In any society in which the elite of that society do not have to do any or very little work, there must be a much larger underclass of people to do the work and support the lifestyles of that elite. This includes not only menial labor, but factory jobs as well.

In the nineteenth century we brought slaves in to do the work. Abe Lincoln and the Union Army brought that program to a halt in 1865. However, someone still had to support the lifestyles of the rich and famous. In one of history's ironies, the wife of Ulysses S. Grant, commander of all the Union forces that freed the slaves, was asked why she hadn't freed her own slaves by 1867.

Her answer was, "Good help is so hard to find these days."

After the Civil War the "giants of industry" began bringing in foreign immigrants to get the work done. They worked much cheaper than those born on American soil. Our history books tell us of the Chinese Exclusion acts and other laws passed to protect American workers.
Those laws, for the most part, didn't work. Such laws were the equivalent of putting a Band-Aid on a bullet hole. The country was rocked with labor unrest from the 1870s up until our entry into World War II in 1941.

After the war, the American labor unions were powerful enough to "hold their own" for quite some time. Then, since the privileged elite of our society could no longer bring slaves or cheap immigrant labor in, they began shipping our jobs out.

Now that particular method of keeping labor costs down and profits up seems to be causing problems. However, there is another source of cheap labor rapidly developing in our nation's prisons. Not only are prisoners a captive source of cheap labor, they are still cheap when they get out. Who wants to hire an ex-con? Most ex cons are lucky to find jobs as dishwashers or janitors. No one with a "record" is going to get hired for anything decent.

Our criminal justice system is creating a new underclass of citizens, those with felony convictions: the new Negroes. Go back thirty or forty years and read the contemporary accounts of how blacks were treated back then. The treatment accorded blacks over forty years ago is exactly the treatment accorded ex-cons today. When an ex-con does get a decent job, he isn't allowed to work at it.

The blacks eventually organized into voting blocs, elected some of their own as representatives in the state and federal legislatures, and finally managed to achieve some measure of acceptance. Ex cons and their families haven't even started to organize. When and if they do, our whole society will be turned upside-down. Blacks (or any other race, for that matter) simply cannot breed new voters as fast as the federal and state governments can create new felons. Most of these "new felons" created by the criminal justice system didn't really do much of anything. For every counterfeiter at the federal level, I'll show you a hundred people who were busted for growing marijuana convicted of laws that are unconstitutional at the federal level and nonsensical at the state level.

How about some law to eradicate the use of tobacco and alcohol instead? Tobacco kills 400,000 people a year and alcohol kills 200,000 a year, including 50,000 innocents killed by drunken drivers. Of course, we tried outlawing alcohol before during Prohibition. It didn't work.
However, most of the people arrested for dealing in illegal booze back in the 1920s and 1930s were charged with misdemeanors.

Today everyone gets bagged for a felony.

Did it ever occur to anyone that maybe what the powers that be really want is a new source of cheap labor, not just a "war on drugs?" There are ways to stop this nonsense, but it's going to require a "team effort."

Ex Cons, Tired of Being Second Class Citizens?

Thu, 17 Aug 2006 05:39:02 GMT

08/16/2006

In the dawning light of the 21th century there are two facts that are not in dispute:

1 . The prison population is increasing.

2. So is the crime rate.

The question is what are we going to do about these problems, if anything?

My observations and the solutions suggested are relatively simple:

1 . Building more prisons to curb crime is like building more hospitals to cure
AIDS.

2. For the most part, people in prison today are no better or no worse than the people in the general population, morally speaking. This wasn't true forty years ago. Forty years ago prisons contained murderers, rapists, kidnappers, robbers, and the like. Today the bulk of the prison population consists of people doing time for drugs, possession of weapons, and so forth. Also included are those who are the victims of police misconduct, dishonest prosecutors, perjury committed in the name of "turning state's evidence," and the like. All of the above is compounded by the "law and order" mentality of today's judges that began during the Nixon administration. It is the duty of a judge to protect the rights of the individual, not to act as a social con- science.

My observations are neither new nor unique. You have probably heard them before. I doubt if anyone has considered my solution.

It is a matter of historical fact that reform never comes from the top down. Why should it? Those who created the problems are the ones who profit by them. You cannot

use someone who is part of the system to fight the system. Reform has always come from the bottom up.
Let's separate the top from the bottom in order for you to see who is "us" and who is "them."
As I write this, there are approximately 2.18 million people behind bars. A few years ago it was 1.7 million. Another 5 million are under one sort or another of judicial supervision. About 11 million people get locked up for one thing or another every year, primarily misdemeanors. According to the Department of Justice statistics a thousand new inmates are recruited to the prison's ranks each week.
Ex-cons and their families (including the families of the currently incarcerated) constitute the largest voting bloc in the history of the Untied States.

Yes, ex cons can vote in most States (including California). Florida, for example, is an exception. Most of these people have friends or family "on the street" also. The number of ex cons in this society, of which I am one, is in the millions. The legal system discriminates against us in a number of ways, from job opportunities (don't try to get a job at the post office), prohibiting us from jury duty (which would allow us to protect our fellow citizens from corrupt court proceedings), to forbidding us firearms to protect our families.
Florida denies the vote to ex-cons. Predictably, Florida also has the most corrupt state court system in the nation. Ask anyone who has been through it.

That's "us." We're unorganized and politically ineffective.
Opposing us are the individuals who use a corrupt legal system to "keep us in our place." This opposition consists of:

745 federal judges.

30,000 state judges.

500,000 law enforcement officers.

1,000,000 lawyers.

These individuals are highly organized and politically effective only because we aren't.

That's "them."

If "us" are going to beat "them," there are a few basic principles we're going to have to keep in mind.

1. We must use military tactics. They are the enemy and must be regarded as such.

2. We cannot use weapons, firearms, and the like. All other considerations aside, such an approach simply won't work. The Zulus put up a magnificent fight in Africa in the 1870s. They lost. They were simply outgunned by the British Army. As are we by our own law enforcement and military.

3. There is always more than one way to engage the enemy. If the enemy has superior numbers of aircraft, wait for fog or rain and attack with tanks.

4. There is one method that almost always works: isolate and destroy.

5. The methods needed to achieve victory are absurdly simple:

A. Isolate and destroy the career of every misbehaving judge.

B. Build voting blocs to control elections.

C. Use the voting blocs to remove from office those who refuse to do what we want.

Let's use examples:

Let's say you were clobbered by a corrupt federal judge. This is how simple it is:

i. File a judicial misconduct complaint, 28 U.S.C. 372(c)(1). More on this can be found on the Internet at: http://www.aps-law.com

ii. Get your friends and family to do the same.

iii. Make sure your Congressman, House of Representatives, get copies of each one filed.

iv. Ask him to impeach the judge. A single Congressman can wreck the career of a federal judge, as Congressman Gerald Ford from Michigan proved when he "got" Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas in 1969.

v. When your Congressman refuses or makes excuses, obtain a computerized mailing list from a mailing list broker in the yellow pages. Prepare a mailing brochure telling the voters why they should throw this bum out. If you cost him his job, his replacement will be more inclined to listen.

Nailing a state judge is even easier. Look up the geographical area he is elected in, just like you would for a Congressman. Same program.
Some states use the Missouri system, in which the voters simply vote "yes" or "no" as to whether the judge should be retained on not. This is a bad system. Most voters simply have no way of knowing whether a judge should be retained or not simply because they've never been in front of him. As a consequence people simply assume he's okay. It is incumbent upon you to convince the public otherwise. You don't have to scrape too many judges off the bench for the rest of them to get the message.

Unfortunately, open elections for judges are even worse. Very few lawyers want to run against a judge they may have to stand in front of later (if they lose the election).

If you scrape the judges off the bench, the police officers and lawyers will behave.

A lot of prisoners and their families think they can't "do anything." The same attitude is held by most ex cons and their families
On the contrary, prisoners have the most effective lines of communication imaginable—other prisoners. Put a thousand men together in the same building with the same
problem created by the same people (lawyers, lawyer-judges, etc.) and the only thing that
can stop them—the prisoners—from correcting the problem is their own
ignorance and their own apathy.

Let's look at the numbers.

Let's lowball the numbers. Let's assume only a million different people are locked up every year. Let's assume, on the average, each of those people has five people on the street who care about him: father, mother, sister, brother, son, daughter, relatives, friends,etc.

Multiply the numbers of prisoners and ex-cons by five over a ten-year period.

That's fifty million (50,000,000) voters. That's the largest voting bloc that ever existed in the history of the United States. That'sa voting bloc large enough to control any election aywhere in the United States, provided that the voting block is organized and has a leader.

This is an excerpt from "The Criminal Defendant's Bible" by Michale H. Brown.

Copies are availible from Erin Rommel School of Law.

Please Contact Peter Jon Simpson
http://www.members.aol.com/rommellaw/ (whole selection of Brown's books)

rommellaw@aol.com

write or call
Peter Jon Simpson
c/o P O Box 211
Atwater Minnesota 56209- 0211

320-857-2400 Fax: 320- 857- 2401

www.michaelhbrown.com
leviticus11.com

VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

Thu, 10 Aug 2006 20:39:15 GMT

VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

With Memorandum in Support
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IN RE "SEPARATION-OF-POWERS"

The "rights" of the federal Executive Branch concerning grand jury proceedings are well known to modern federal courts. E.g., "It remains the prerogative and responsibility of the executive to determine whether to prosecute at all." United States v. Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953, 943 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Udziela, 671 F.2d 995, 999 (7th Cir. 1982) (" . . . we must take care not to encroach on legitimate executive activities before the grand jury.")

There are no "legitimate executive activities before the grand jury" as such and there have never been.
Daniel Boorstein, noted historian and Librarian of Congress Emeritus, once described legal history in this country as a "Dark Continent," stating that " . . . we are ignoramuses about America's legal past . . ." Raack, Some Reflections On The Role Of
Legal History In Legal Education, 26 Duquesne L. Rev. 893 (1988).
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the history of the prosecutor's function in regards to the grand jury. Supposedly, the grand jury is a pre-constitutional institution,
given constitutional stature by the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977).

If this is in fact true, then the grand jury would have to
function in the same manner and fashion as its British predecessor, anything less would constitute an unconstitutional procedure:
"I know not how long the practice in that matter of admitting counsel to a grand-jury hath been; I am sure it is a very unjustifiable and unsufferable one. If the grand-jury have a doubt in point of law, they ought to have recourse to the court, and that publicly, and not privately, and not to rely upon the private opinion of counsel, especially of the king's counsel, who
are, or at least behave themselves as if they were parties."
Remarks on Colledge's Trial, by Sir John Hawles, Solicitor-General in the Reign of King William the Third, 8 How. St. Tr. 724 (1681)

The Declaration of Rights of 1689 is antecedent of our own constitutional text.
The original meaning and circumstances of that enactment are relevant. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2687 (1991).
Merely allowing a prosecutor in the grand jury room was a violation of the grand jurors' oath. Proceedings Against The Earl Of Shaftesbury, 8 How. St. Tr. 759, 773 (1681), quoted in Hale v. Henkel, 26 S.Ct. 370, 373 (1906).

To this day this is the law in Connecticut State grand juries. Cobbs v. Robinson,528 F.2d 1331, 1338 (2nd Cir. 1975).

Under the procedures followed by our ancestors before their migrations from England the prosecution of offenses was left entirely to private persons, or to public officers who acted in their capacity of private persons and who had hardly any legal powers beyond those which belonged to private persons. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Volume I, at 493, quoted in United States v. Marion, 92 S.Ct. 455, 468 note 2 (1971).

The idea of a public prosecutor is a French practice. Id.

The English practice was that followed in the United States for some time.
Private individuals conducted the bulk of prosecutions in colonial times. Dongel,Is Prosecution A Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers Intent, 99 Yale L. J. 1069 (1990). See also United States v. Baird, 85 F. 633 (C.Ct.D.N.J. 1897) (complaint by postal inspector), In Re Price, 83 F. 830 (C.Ct.S.D.N.Y. 1897) (complaint
by private citizen), United States v. Farrington, supra, (evidence of grand jurors competent to ascertain who was prosecutor).
The absurdity of the "rights" of public prosecutors in grand jury proceedings was addressed over a hundred years ago:

But, Mr. Chairman, in order to get a more distinct idea of this matter, let us for a moment briefly consider the functions and duties of Grand Juries; and, as I understand it, their main duty is to examine the records of witnesses, or both, and come to a conclusion as to whether persons accused of crime ought be tried or not. This they do under the advice of the District Attorney. In many cases they are, in whole or in part, composed of persons ignorant of the law; and in a majority of cases, if the
District Attorney tells them that the evidence is sufficient to convict they indict, and on the contrary, if he tells them the evidence is not sufficient, they do not indict. They are, in the very nature of things, almost entirely

under the control of the District Attorney, in all matters coming up in the Grand Jury room, and merely echo his opinions. The whole thing, then, practically viewed, merely amounts to a roundabout and very expensive method of getting the opinion of the District Attorney. And I submit that if this be necessary in order to insure the ends of justice, then, in the name of common sense, why not get the opinion of the District Attorney directly, and thus curtail the enormous expense attending the present system?

1 Debates and Proceedings of the State of California, 308-17 (1880).
Remarks of Mr. Huestis during 1878-79 California Constitutional
Convention. The separation-of-powers doctrine, in this respect, has been completely flouted.

This doctrine is essential to the preservation of liberty. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 1976-77 (1990); Mistratta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 659 (1989), Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2620 (1988), Humphrey’s Ex R v. United States, 55 S.Ct. 869, 874-875 (1935).
Where the executive branch was given the power to declare existing law to grand jurors has never been explained. Permission to so instruct members of the grand jury in "existing law" by an attorney for the government is not even given in the language of
Rule 6(d) or 28 U.S.C. § 515(a).
"To declare what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power; to declare what the law shall be, is legislative." Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 272, 277 (1804).
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Iowa Utilities Board v. F.C.C., 135 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 1998).
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which is meant when adopted, it means now. South Carolina v. United States, 26 S.Ct. 110, 111 (1905).

" . . . law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts . . . are bound by that instrument." Marbury v. Madison, supra.
That the federal grand juries in the United States are instructed by the executive, as opposed to the judiciary, in the law is simply a matter of public record. See, e.g.,
United States v. Regan, 897 F.Supp. 748, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In this case the judge had to review the grand jury minutes to see what the instructions were (given by the prosecutor). See page 754, note 2. See also United States v. Anderson, 61 F.3d 1290, 1296-1297 (7th Cir. 1995) (reference to prosecutor mis-instructing grand jury on applicable law).
Such a procedure, not even authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d) itself, violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Separation-of-Powers was looked to as a bulwark against tyranny. United States v. Brown, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1712 (1965).
The Executive Branch is the branch most likely to forget the bounds of its authority. Id.

A grand jury instructed by a federal prosecutor is a defect so fundamental that the grand jury has ceased to be a grand jury. A case that bears quoting:
Rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights must be zealously guarded if they are not to be whittled away, little by little, through minor seemingly innocuous intrusions which may, over the course of time, result in significant erosion of those rights. The comment of the Court in Boyd v. United States, 6 S.Ct. at 535, is particularly apposite to this situation:

"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
In re Nwamu, 421 F.Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Compare:
I see no valid basis for assuming that the courts in your country will permit private citizens to file indictments as prosecutors.

This right of private criminal complaints was lost in the wake of the Civil War during ca. 1870-1895; on the model of the military prosecutor (modeled on European inquisitorial criminal procedure), the American accusatorial system of private complaint was altered, placing the district attorney in the position of the private criminal plaintiff of old. The transition decades were marked by numerous judgments deliberating whether the private party had a right through his attorney, to assist the public prosecutor.
Thus, though this field is of great historical interest, there is to my mind not one shroud of hope left to revive the ancient rights of the private citizen (unless of course through legislative channels).
Letter from Stefan Grossmann of Frankfurt, Germany, Point 1 of summary of thesis, Prosecutors in the American Legal Tradition – The Path to Virtual Criminal Trial, (April 15, 1998).

I.e., it seems exceedingly strange that a German attorney can recognize the problem but American federal judges and prosecutors cannot (or simply refuse to).

As a general rule, under the principle of the separation of powers, the legislature is prohibited from encroaching upon, or unduly burdening or interfering with the judicial department in its exercise of judicial functions and divesting the judiciary of its inherent powers. United States v. Carrollo, 30 F.Supp. 3 (W.D.Mo. 1939).

I.e., has the federal legislature, in enacting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 515(a), encroached upon the powers of the judiciary; or, has the executive branch, in all modern grand jury cases, simply usurped the function by instructing the grand jury in the law? Or have both branches done so?

The type of behavior engaged in by today's United States Attorneys and its eventual consequences was predicted long ago:
Under British rule, the colonies suffered the abuses of unchecked executive power. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. 2763, 2789 (1983). The doctrine of "separation of powers" is violated when one branch of the government assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another (as in grand jurors being instructed in the law by a government attorney instead of a judge). Id. at 2790.

It is the duty of each branch of the government to abstain from, and to oppose encroachments on each other. Muskrat v. United States, 31 S.Ct. 250, 252 (1911). The separation of powers is “a doctrine to which the courts must adhere even in the absence of an explicit statutory command.” Tew v. United States, 86 F.3d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir.
1996) (citation omitted).

THE COURTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OR
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS BY MEANS ALONE OF JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION:

"After many years of public service at the national capital, and after a somewhat close observation of the conduct of public affairs, I am impelled to say that there is abroad in our land a most harmful tendency to bring about the amending of constitutions
and legislative enactments by means alone of judicial construction." Standard Oil Co. vs. United States, 31 S.Ct. 502, 533 (1910) (Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The judicial function is that of interpretation; it does not include the power of amendment under the guise of interpretation. To miss the point of difference between the two is to miss all that the phrase "supreme law of the land" stands for and to convert what was intended as inescapable and enduring mandates into mere moral reflections. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 S.Ct. 578, 587 (1937) (dissent).

Some examples of that process are seen as follows:
A subsequent grand jury has the power to indict upon a charge that has been considered previously and rejected by a prior grand jury. United States v. Gakoumis, 624 F.Supp. 655, 656 (E.D.Pa. 1985). At common law there was no authority to continue the case of a preceding grand jury. Joyce On Indictments at 116 (1908). One federal judge, though apparently ignorant of the common law, suggested that Congress prohibit presenting a matter to another grand jury if the first grand jury issued a "no bill." See
United States v. International Paper Co., 457 F.Supp. 571, 577 (S.D. Texas 1978).
The rule of stare decisis . . . is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court. See Hertz v. Woodman, 30 S.Ct. 621, 622 (1910).
Stare decisis . . . is not a universal, inexorable command. State of Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 44 S.Ct. 302, 309 (1924).

The doctrine of stare decisis . . . has only a limited application in the field of constitutional law. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 56 S.Ct. 720, 744 (1936).
One would think this would include a clearly shown adoption of wrong principles. Id.
Even today the doctrine is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991) (citations omitted).

What the Courts are supposed to do is as follows:
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and established by the people. All legislation must conform to the principles it lays down. When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the court does, or can do, is to
announce its considered judgment upon the question. The only power it has, if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. This court neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution; and, having done that, its duty ends. United States v. Butler, 56 S.Ct. 312, 318 (1935)

Every federal judge takes an oath to uphold the Constitution, 28 U.S.C. 453. No such oath exists to uphold precedent. A remark by Sir John Hawles bears repeating:
The office of a judge is . . . not to make any law by strains of wit, or forced Interpretations; but plainly and impartially to declare the Law already established.
The English-mans Right, page 10 (1680)

To warrant the return of an indictment it should be based on competent legal evidence, such as is legitimate and proper before a petit jury. 20 Cyc. 1346; United States v. Kilpatrick (D.C.) 16 Fed. 765; United States v. Reed, Fed.Cas.No. 16,134.
This principle of law, which had stood for centuries was then changed to allow the introduction of nothing but hearsay evidence by the Supreme Court. Costello v. United States, 76 S.Ct. 406 (1956).

THE COURTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO REWRITE OR FALSIFY HISTORY IN
ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A DECISION

The Courts have invoked a rather distinct historical technique which deserves some examination. The resort to the extended essay in constitutional history is usually what should be called the "law-office" variety.
By the term "law-office" history is meant the selection of data favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: an Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Supreme Court Review 119, 144.

Stare decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters of history. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2512 (1985).
Unless courts continually check back with the sources of their authority, the process of interpretation can become a rumor chain. Tiny variations at each retelling cascade, until the tale is unrecognizable to its originator. Hicky v. Duffy, 827 F.2d 234,242 (7th Cir. 1987).

"Painting black lines on the sides of a horse and calling it a zebra does not make it one." United States v. Vazquez-Rivera, 135 F.3d 172, 177 (1st Cir. 1998).

Which is exactly what the courts have done with what our forefathers understood as "indictment by grand jury."
Some years ago, Senator Edward M. Kennedy commented that we were allowing dangerous procedures to come about as follows:
Over the past four years . . . we have witnessed the birth of a new breed of political animal—the kangaroo grand jury—spawned in a dark corner of
the Department of Justice, nourished by an administration bent on twisting law enforcement to serve its own political ends, a dangerous modern form of star chamber secret inquisition that is trampling the rights of American citizens from coast to coast.

Hearings on Grand Jury before subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Congress; 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
The question for this Court is this:
Which Constitution is this Court going to follow? The one authored by our ancestors or the one that is the product of judicial construction?

Crooked Courts and Cruel Incarceration

Tue, 01 Aug 2006 03:04:43 GMT

Crooked Courts and Cruel Incarceration

Newspapers and magazines are quick to carry stories of prison inmates suing in federal court. The stories infer that all prisoner lawsuits are frivolous and without merit. They point out that state offices are wasting too much of the
taxpayers' money to defend the prison officials sued by those inmates.

A good example is the September 11, 1995 transcript of the National Public Radio show, All Things Considered. It starts out with this statement: "Lawsuits by inmates have reached such crisis
levels that it's costing taxpayers millions of dollars. Some call them recreational litigators, but the most popular term for them is 'Frequent Filers.' "

Unless the major media exposes cruel treatment in our prisons, Americans are all too busy doing their jobs, raising their kids, keeping their bodies in shape, and being entertained to find out what is going on behind the wall.

When a major network does cover wrongs inflicted on inmates by prison employees, outrage pours forth and usually results in "someone" doing "something" about it. What about the wrongs they miss or choose not to uncover? It is up to relatives and friends of inmates to write letters to the local news editor, their Congressman and Senators, and even their state legislators to make an effort to expose the situation.

Most law-abiding citizens may not have much sympathy for those imprisoned by the various states or the federal government. The problem is with overzealous prosecutors and the judges who work with them week in and week out. Most judges tend to favor the government, making it easier for innocent people to get convicted of crimes that never happened or that they simply did not commit.

The State of Illinois is a good example. In the past year several inmates on death row have been exonerated and set free. Those men lost years of their lives for crimes they did not commit. The truth came out only because some university students took on projects to search for the truth. Their work was lengthy and tedious but finally rewarded with the satisfaction that they did the right thing--freeing an innocent man. Numerous reporters have criticized the Illinois legal system.

No fewer than 12 people who were on death row [in Illinois] have been found innocent of the crimes they supposedly committed, some just days before they were to be put to death. Some of them wound up being sentenced to death because witnesses in their trials testified falsely for a myriad of reasons. Others were there because, in an overzealous effort to "solve" highly visible crimes, cops fabricated evidence. Whatever the reasons, innocent people were about to be killed by their own government, and who knows how many others actually were?

Dave Zweifel, Illinois Reason Enough To Ban Death Penalty, Capital Times (Madison, WI), June 25, 999, page 12A.

What about all those in prison who aren't in a project to search for the truth? They are just out of luck. No one cares as long as it isn't their father, their brother, their mother, their sister, or even themselves.

In the fifties and sixties an elderly high school English teacher, Miss Elizabeth Little, always taught her students that, "There, but for the grace of God, go I." She told them to remember that phrase if they saw someone in a situation in which they certainly would not want to be. For example, homeless, diseased, impaired, or imprisoned.
How would you like to be a woman incarcerated in the Topeka Correctional Facility in Topeka, Kansas? A law-abiding citizen probably cannot imagine what it would be like. He can rationalize that if those women had obeyed the law, they wouldn't be there. They are serving the time for which they were sentenced by a court of law. This is punishment in a civilized society--if you do the crime, you do the time.

Exactly how civilized are we? The following is a small sample of what the women in the Topeka Correctional Facility undergo.
Female inmates have complained repeatedly about the overcrowding, lack of sanitation, inadequate ventilation, and other problems in the Topeka Correctional Facility. They have had to endure these conditions for several years. The Kansas "grievance" procedure appears to be an exercise in futility for them.

The complaints are reasonable, not frivolous as the State of Kansas would have the public believe. A few examples: The cells were built for one occupant, but some have been used to house two inmates. Bright lights are left on all night in each cell. The inmates who don't smoke are subjected to second-hand cigarette smoke. The shower facilities expose female inmates to a variety of males.

Inmate Pam Livingston commented on the lighting in the cells. "We are exposed to night lights in our cells twenty-four hours a day. These night lights are strong enough to read my Bible with no assistance from any other source of light. It is quite disturbing when trying to sleep. We have no means to turn the night lights off."

Inmate Debora Green described the situation involving cigarette smoke as follows: "Secondhand smoke is a real problem at I Cell House. The ventilation system of the majority of the rooms is such that four rooms share a vent. If anyone in one of these rooms smokes in the room, the smoke disseminates throughout all four rooms. (On numerous occasions the officers have threatened to write up everyone in all four rooms when the smoke detectors are set off 'because there is no way to tell which room it is coming from.')."

The kitchen workers have scooped various kinds of insects out of pans of food, then fed it to the inmates. One time the kitchen supervisor told the kitchen workers to fish out a large cockroach, feed the contaminated food to the other inmates, and not say anything. Feeding insect-infested food, spoiled milk, food spilled on the floor and the like to the inmates is a common practice.

The prison is sometimes infested with mice. "Sticky traps" to catch and torture mice to death are all over the place. One inmate killed several mice in one day by stomping on them while working in the dog kennel. An officer made her stop killing them that way.

Inmate Vickie Lumley had an experience which to her was terrifying. "I have seen many mice in my work area at I-Cell. I have had mice in my cell. Recently I screamed because a mouse ran over my foot while I was in my nightgown in my cell. It was very scary!"

Inmate Sunshine Goodwin has had similar experiences. "I've had mice, spiders, and ants in my room more than once."

Inmate Angela Barnes also has unwanted visitors over which she has no control. "I have seen mice in my room. I had an officer come and step on one about 2 o'clock in the morning. They chewed on a lot of my food and I had to get rid of it."

There are no bathroom facilities available when the inmates are out on the yard or working in the dog kennels, and some of the correctional officers will not permit inmates to go back in early to use the facilities.

New inmates (first 120 days) are not allowed to spend enough money for their personal hygiene items and are not issued deodorant or shampoo, although the dogs in the kennels get untangling shampoo.
Inmate Gail Daws described the lack of supplies for a simple act of cleanliness that civilized people take for granted such as washing hands after using the toilet facilities or a simple shower. "We are not provided with any type of soap in our cells or in the showers."

The shower curtains are too small and short for the shower stalls. Because the shower curtains are inadequate, when women use the shower, they are exposed to other inmates and to staff personnel, some of whom are male.

Inmate Gail Daws commented on the shower situation. "While taking showers, the shower curtains are clear plastic up to our knee area. When or if we drop something and bend over to pick it up our private parts (such as our breasts) are exposed to the rest of the dayroom area. Most times there are male guards, other inmates, male maintenance workers, and male inmates who are in our dayroom while we are in the showers."

Female inmates' private parts are routinely exposed to the guards, including one woman who was "written up" because she had trouble urinating while naked in front of two guards.

The water is turned off at different times for unknown reasons. Water leaks in at various places even when there is no rain. Water leaked into an inmate's cell through the ceiling. When she got out of bed, not knowing there was water all over the floor, she slipped and sprained her ankle and injured her knee.

There are cracks in various areas, especially at the top of the center stairs, going all the way across the top tier floor in some places and all the way through. Ceilings sometimes cave in from too much water.

A nurse witnessed the ceiling in the clinic falling on inmate Rachelle Shannon. Maintenance men repaired and painted Room A118 after the ceiling caved in for the second time. This particular ceiling still leaks.

The Topeka Correctional Facility did not want to pay for a sewer grinder, so there is a basket on a cable that the sewage flows through. The basket catches the solid waste. A red alarm light is connected to the basket. When it lights up, it indicates that the lift basket is full. It is common knowledge that the sewer will be backing up into the building if something is not done quickly. An inmate has to scoop out feces along with other waste material and put it in a trash can. It then goes out with the regular garbage.

Inmate Angela Barnes said she had to "squeegee raw sewage that included pieces of bloody toilet paper."

Inmate Pam Livingston who was assigned to cleaning the sewer pit said, "It contains raw sewage which is placed in a doubled plastic bag, put in a trash container and left with the regular trash, which is taken out daily by the compound trash inmates."

Inmate Melony Reed, assigned to cleaning the sewer pit, said, "It appears to me that the things in the basket are not ground up and there are most definitely feces and bloody sanitary napkins."

Inmate Sunshine Goodwin said, "When we do the sewage it's not put in hazard bags. It's put with the rest of the garbage."

When the sewer backs up, water comes up the drains, including in the kitchen. Raw sewage goes back and forth between the toilets (when one inmate flushes the toilet, it comes up the neighboring toilet). Sewer water with toilet paper comes up in the halls of the laundry and the kitchen. The resulting mess is cleaned up with blankets that afterwards are sent out and given no special cleaning at the laundry. After being laundered those blankets still smell of sewage and then are re-issued to the inmates for bedding.

The dirty clothing and bedding of the inmates are sent out to be washed. Inmates are ordered not to wash out any clothing, including bloody or otherwise dirty underwear. Inmates are supposed to put them in a mesh bag and hang them from a hook in their cell for up to 3 days (until laundry turn-in time). When these "cleaned" clothes are returned, they stink. When rinsed, brown water comes out of the clothes.

Seventy-six women are given one or two spray bottles of bleach diluted with water each day. That is supposed to be enough to clean all of the rooms, plus the day room and showers.
The above information on the conditions in the Topeka Correctional Facility can be found in a lawsuit that an inmate filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas (Topeka): Shannon v. Graves, 98-CV-3395. Shannon is inmate Rachelle Shannon (incarcerated for shooting Dr. George Tiller, an abortionist, in Wichita). Graves is Bill Graves, the Governor of Kansas.

The State of Kansas has done everything possible to keep the costs of the Topeka Correctional Facility to a minimum. (Even the dogs at the facility are treated more humanely than the female inmates are.)

-Michael H. Brown

Who Repealed The Second Amendment? And By What Authority?

Tue, 01 Aug 2006 02:59:00 GMT

The Second Amendment is quite plain to most of us:

A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

87% of us--the common people--understand that this Amendment refers to an individual right. The problem is, the "right" has been reduced almost to a nullity by Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court and our federal judiciary. Those individuals are almost all members of a class of people that--at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights--were considered only one step above the occupation of the common thief--lawyers.

Their position in the courts has been that the "right" is a collective right and applies to the States, not the individual.

A great number of "law professors" support that nonsensical viewpoint. See, e.g., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, Don B Kates, Jr., Volume 82 Michigan Law Review 204, 207, note 11 (1983).

This "collective right" theory was first enunciated by the Kansas Supreme Court in 1905. Salina v. Blakesly, 72 Kansas 230; 83 Pacific Reporter 61 (1905). The theory is patently wrong. Handgun Prohibition, supra, page 211, note 31. As Mr. Kates, in Handgun Prohibition pointed out, the word "people" in the First and Fourth Amendments ("individuals") did not change meaning in the Second.

Not to mention that "States Rights" received its death sentence at Appomattox in 1865.

Mr. Kates position is borne out by the history of the ratification of the Second Amendment itself. See B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 1153-54 (1971).

In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Senator James L. Buckley (R.- N.Y.) reiterated this position during the course of discussion of proposed handgun regulation:

At the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, this country's statesmen were concern with the need to protect citizen's from government itself, and the passage of almost two centuries has not negated the validity of this concern. The fact that Article I, Section 8, clause 16 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to organize, arm and discipline the militia clearly indicates a quite different intention for the Second Amendment.

Congressional Record, S. 6889 (daily ed. April 28, 1975) (remarks of Senator Buckley).

One must, of course, understand the meaning of the Constitution by the intent of those who wrote it. Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887).

The American Bar Association supports "gun control." Handgun Prohibition, supra, note 13. As does the ACLU.

Not surprisingly, these "scribble warriors" of the lawyers bar (and the major media in lock-step) are extremely protective of the First Amendment (freedom of speech and the press) while relegating the Second Amendment to merely a passing glance.

My proof of this? Pick up a copy of West's United States Code Annotated, the volume titled Amendment 1 to 3, in almost any law library. The court cases explaining the First Amendment number from page 9 to page 947. The court cases addressing the Second Amendment number 949 to 955.

Worse, many of the court cases cited in those pages are simply wrong. For example, in United States v. Oakes, 564 F. 2d 387, 394 (10th Cir. 1977), the judges (including Chief Justice Lewis, whose duty it was to keep the other "public servants"-- i.e., the judges--in line) held that the purpose of the Second Amendment was to preserve the effectiveness and assure the continuation of the state militia.

Oakes was convicted of the possession of an unregistered machine-gun. Oakes had been "set-up" for the bust by a BATF agent. Your tax dollars at work.

The judges' strained and twisted misuse of the word "militia" as referring to a body of troops sanctioned by the individual state is easily refuted.

First, let's consider how Congress (the people we vote in and--not frequently enough--vote out) defines "militia" in clear and immutable terms:

10 U.S.C. § 311 Militia: composition and classes

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of Title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.

Section 313 of Title 32 merely refers to those individuals who are already members of the National Guard. The nineteenth century Supreme Court flatly stated that, "the militia is all citizens capable of bearing arms." Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886).
This has been true since the first Militia, Act 1 Stat. 271 (1792), enacted by the Congress. Today's Supreme Court, in the words of one law professor, ". . . shamefully refuses to discuss the issue." The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale Law Journal 637, 654 (1990). Another law professor pointed out, ". . . the Supreme Court admitted exceptions to the right to keep and bear arms but refuses to recognize the right itself. 2 William and Mary Law Review 381,405 (1960).

Another law professor (for obvious reasons, I am only quoting the ones on "our side", you can get all the others on the "glass toilet") pointed out that the lower courts (those under the U.S. Supreme Court) generally have either adopted an interpretation that is implausible on its face, inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and unsupported by historical evidence about the intention of the Framers, or they have adhered to ancient precedents that treated the Bill of Rights as being inapplicable to the States.

This particular law professor also pointed out that the Supreme Court, moreover, inscrutably denies all petitions for certiorari (discretionary review). The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, And The Right To Self Preservation, Vol. 39 Alabama Law Review 103 (1987).

Professor Nelson Lund, who authored the above Alabama Law Review article (and whom I nominate to be U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice), also pointed out other items of interest. On page 107, note 8, he states that "well-regulated" means "properly disciplined", not "government controlled". On page 112, note 24, he states that the "collective right" interpretation is virtually baseless (as in the Oakes decision). On page 114, he states that the militia was intended to be a counterweight to government military forces. Finally, he reminds us that federal judges have a duty to enforce the Constitution whether they agree with it or not.

Put five men like Professor Lund on the U.S. Supreme Court and the NRA could fold up shop and go on to other concerns. The present Supreme Court could easily be impeached. Every federal judge takes a solemn oath to uphold the U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 453. Violation of that oath is grounds for impeachment. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, page 6896 (1990).

Earlier Supreme Courts recognized that the right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed by Congress. Presser, supra; also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).

Today's Congress infringes on those rights on a regular basis--The Brady Bill, the "assault rifles" ban-- etc. etc. In order to do so Congress invokes the interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution at Art. I, sec. 8, clause 3. Today's Supreme Court upholds that nonsense. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977).

How did we have our Second Amendment rights taken away (don't think Big Brother is finished yet) and for what purpose?

Let's start with "how."

Congress enacted a "tax" on sawed-off shotguns in 1934. Jack Miller and Frank Layton, from Oklahoma, drove a sawed-off shotgun into Arkansas and were indicted for that in 1938. The federal district court judge, Heartsill Ragon, simply quoted the language of the Second Amendment, declared the statute unconstitutional, and dismissed the indictment. United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Ark. 1939). Judge Ragon's published ruling covers about one-half page.

That ruling was appealed by government prosecutors. Those prosecutors then "had their way" because neither Miller or Layton, who both had disappeared, presented their side of the issue to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

in the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
Aymette v State of Tennessee, 2 Humph., Tenn., 154, 158

Of the eight Supreme Court justices who voted for this, six had absolutely no military experience. The other two, Hugo L. Black and Stanley F. Reed, received the rank of captain of artillery (1917) and first lieutenant (1918) respectively without ever seeing combat or leaving American soil. James Clark McReynolds, who authored the opinion in Miller, had no military experience whatsoever. The then Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes, was apparently a pacifist, having been the chairman of the International Conference on Limitations of Armaments, elected to the League of Nations (the first try for a "U.N.") and who-knows-what else.

Miller was held to be an outdated opinion as long ago as the beginning of WW II. Cases v United States, 131 F. 2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942). Sawed-off shotguns have considerable utility as military weapons. From Trenches To Squad Cars, Black, The American Rifleman, June 1982, pg. 30.

Ask anyone who has ever crewed on a tank which weapon he wants when an enemy soldier pries open a hatch cover: a rifle too awkward to get into position, a pistol that has to be aimed, or a sawed-off shotgun that merely has to be pointed straight up.

As another law professor put it, most Gun Control Acts enacted by Congress are mere political grandstanding. Enforcement of Gun Control: A Victimless Crimes Analysis, 16 Criminal Law Bulletin 131, 132 (1980).

Once the Supreme Court upheld the first violation of the Second Amendment, "grandstanding" by Congress increased. In recent years, the trickle of anti-Second Amendment violations has become a deluge.

Why? Because when our Republic was first founded, the right to keep and bear arms was equated with the right to revolt. 2 William and Mary Law Review 381, 385 (1960). On page 393 of the same article the author quotes Patrick Henry, who sarcastically referred to the remote possibility that Congress would use the militia wisely.

As Henry's contemporary George Mason pointed out, the most effective way to enslave a people is to disarm them. 3 The Papers of George Mason 1725-1792, page 1075 (Robert A. Rutland edition, 1970). A government resting on a minority is an aristocracy. That aristocracy is not safe without a standing army, an enslaved press and a disarmed populace. 82 Michigan Law Review 204, 228 (1983). Aristotle and Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey both made similar statements. Id., pages 232 and 271.

Only governments have ever disarmed any considerable class of people as a means towards their enslavement. Free Speech For Radicals 104, T. Schroeder, (reprint edition 1969).

The original intent of the framers of the Second Amendment was not only for the people to have the right to be armed, but to be armed at a level equal to the government. The History of the Second Amendment, 28 Valparaiso University Law Review, 1007, 1009 (1994).

One of the fears of the framers of the Second Amendment was that the central government would bring into being a professional police force, precisely the kind of hireling body considered dangerous by conventional political theory. The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale Law Journal, 637, 646 note 46 (1990).

This has been recently demonstrated by the BATF and the FBI at Waco, Texas and Ruby Ridge, Idaho.

You will notice that the "privileged elite" somehow manage to maintain control of their weapons (remember Sen. Ted Kennedy's bodyguards found with fully automatic guns in the Senate building in the 1980s ?) while constantly attempting to deprive the rest of us of ours. This isn't anything new. As long ago as the seventeenth century the English Stuart kings enacted the Game Act of 1671, 22 Corr. 2, chapt. 25, Section 3, limiting the possession of a firearm to English noblemen. In 1689, a year after the Stuarts were replaced by William and Mary, Englishmen got their guns back.

In the next century the English government passed a law disarming the Scots. The Whig clans, to show loyalty and obedience to the English government, surrendered their weapons. The Jacobite Highland clans, hostile to the English government, hid theirs. In 1745 the friends of the government were disarmed while its enemies were in a state of preparation. Manners, Customs and History of the Highlanders of Scotland, Sir Walter Scott, pgs 89-90.

In 1745 English government forces were soundly defeated at Prestonpans. The Scots lost to the English Army in 1746 at the Battle of Culloden, more attributable to their leaders' mismanagement than their lack of weapons.

We have exactly the same problem. While the New York Times editorializes that ". . . the urban handgun offers no benefits. . . ", its publisher, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, had a New York City permit to carry a gun at all times. As did gun prohibition advocates Nelson Rockefeller and former New York Mayor John Lindsay.

Psychologist Dr. Joyce Brothers, who has publicly stated that men posses guns to compensate for sexual dysfunction, did not have a gun permit. Her husband did. Handgun Prohibition And The Original Meaning Of The Second Amendment, 82 Michigan Law Review 204, 207, note 11 (1983).

Finally, we come to the end of the problem and the beginning of the solution: get rid of the people causing the problem. The NRA does an excellent job of targeting anti-Second Amendment politicians and defeating them. Unfortunately, the NRA (of which I am a member) appears to remain completely clueless as to the role of the federal judiciary in our disarmament. An occasional federal judge does appear to recognize that marksmanship is still important. Garett v Alexander, 477 F.Supp. 1035, 1051 (D.C. D.C. 1979) (". . . providing the United States with marksman for service to the country in the event of war) (Harold H Greene, District Judge).

When an employee does not perform satisfactorily, you fire him.

A Congressman you vote out of office.

The process of getting a corrupt, arrogant or otherwise misbehaving federal judge off the bench begins on the floor of the House of Representatives. A Bill of Impeachment can be brought by a single member of that body, as Gerald Ford did to Abe Fortas in 1969.

Write your Congressman and tell him what you want done, why (send him a copy of this article), and to whom. If he refuses, his re-election is a few months away.

(Editor's note: written in 1996)
Michael H. Brown

September 11th, 2001

Tue, 01 Aug 2006 02:56:48 GMT

There is considerable talk of "another war" in order to "retaliate" for what was done to thousands of American citizens at the twin towers, the World Trade Center, on September 11, 2001.
There are a number of problems with what "our leaders" and our news media are telling us, such as, "who is to blame?"

The first and most obvious recipients of our blame should be the politicians and the judges who have done everything they can to render us defenseless for the last several generations with a plethora of laws, both enacted and enforced, to disarm us. If ever there was an irrefutable argument for "right to carry" (concealed weapons), this was it. Can anyone deny that a single handgun in the hands of a passenger or crew member would have stopped any one of those plane takeovers?

The "solution" now is to arm a "sky marshal" and have him, at extra expense, sit in the plane. A presence so obvious can hardly act as much of a deterrent. All someone has to do is get close enough to him and "take him out." If a couple of airline crew members were armed with concealed firearms, no one would know who to attack.
As it was, those who boarded those fatal flights knew, to a 100% certainty, that no one on any of those planes would be packing a handgun. Thousands of people would be alive today if anyone had.

The second, and most obvious recipient of our blame, should be ourselves. I realize I'm probably going to be called an idiot (and worse) for this, but let's look at our own behavior through the politicians we keep electing over the last forty years and consider if perhaps "retaliation" is what those "terrorists" hand in mind.

In 1961 we began to send small units of troops into Vietnam. That war, in which we were apparently attempting to prop up a government more corrupt than our own, ended for us in 1975. By the time it ended, in a nation of 20 million people, 1 million of them were dead. 300,000 of their soldiers are still missing and unaccounted for. Vietnamese children are still stepping on our land mines until this day. There are so many of our land mines in Cambodia that one out of 100 of their citizens are amputees.

In 1983 we established a military presence in Beirut, Lebanon. We lost 241 U.S. Marines in a single explosion created by a suicide bomber with a truck. What preceded that explosion was several days of American fighter-bombers from carriers offshore bombing Druse villages in the mountains of Lebanon.

Beirut at the time was the center of Islamic banking being put on computers. Islamic banking, unlike ours, does not operate on a fixed rate of interest secured by collateral. In Islam banking the banker puts the lender together with the borrower and "brokers" a deal to share profits. We bombed that program, on computers, into oblivion. The World Trade Center appears to have been the center of Western banking.

In 1980 our CIA convinced Saddam Hussein that the Ayatollah Khomeini had cancer and that he could attack with impunity. The resulting war lasted from 1980 to 1989 and resulted in some of the largest land battles seen on the planet since World War I. Hundreds of thousands died. Even more were maimed.
In 1989 the Kuwaitis began drilling in the Ruimalla oil fields in northern Kuwait and southern Iraq. Most of the surface area was owned by Iraq. Imagine a swimming pool, 90% of the surface owned by Iraq. Pump the water out of the 10% area as fast as you can and you get the idea. That's what the Kuwaitis were doing to Iraq.

Saddam Hussein, before he invaded Kuwait to say, "stop thief," checked with our government to see if our "dog was in this fight." We lied.
Before the Persian Gulf War was over, a quarter million Iraqis, most of them civilians, lay dead. No one in this country seemed to notice that the Moslem world didn't approve of this type of behavior on our part because it was "good for our economy."

The slaughter in the Persian Gulf was so one-sided that many of our own soldiers were disgusted by it. They told reporters, "Don't call this Operation Desert Storm, call it Desert Slaughter." Among other examples of our behavior, consider the burying alive of wounded Iraqi soldiers with bulldozers in slit trenches.

These are only three examples. Colombia would make four. Kosovo and Serbia would make five.
Now let's consider the next state of this scenario. Supposedly, we're going to find out who the "bad guys" are, which country sponsored them, and "bring them to justice," possibly by starting another war.
More problems.

Notice that these terrorists come from several countries, some of which are supposed to be "on our side." Moslems don't unite by nation-states, they unite by religion. If we declare war against the Moslems of the world, we can't win. Only Anglo-Saxons draw imaginary lines in the ground (called borders) and then unite behind them (normally to fight each other).

Even if we do manage to declare war against some Moslem nation-state (preferably a small one), we probably still can't win (unless we turn that country into a radioactive cinder pile with thermonuclear weapons, a move that might be more than frowned upon by the rest of the world).
84% of our population think we should "kick butt."
94% of our population has no military experience whatsoever.

Our equipment is in the sorriest state and our troops in the lowest numbers since before Pearl Harbor. Once the shooting starts, what are we going to replace our dead and wounded soldiers with?

The draft?
We don't have one.
If we did, who's going to show up?
If they do show up, how many of them would be 4F?

75% of our citizens are overweight, 33% obese. Are we going to set up recruiting centers at Weight Watchers?

Of those who are physically fit and suitable for Cannon fodder, how many have parents who will send them out of the country to keep them out of harm's way?

There is a further irony here.
There isn't "another war" in the offing. What we have is a war that actually started in the 8th century with the conquest of Christian Spain by Moslems in 711 AD. The Moslems invaded Constantinople in 716 (they failed) and occupied Nimes in France in 725. At Tours in France in 732 they were defeated by Charles Martel and retreated back into Spain. The Moslems were defeated again at Avignon in France in 737. The Moslems were not driven out of Spain until 1492, when Grenada fell.
The war between Christians and Moslems did not actually end until October 30, 1918, when the Allies signed an armistice with the Ottoman Turks (Moslem).

I.e., Christians fought Moslems for over 1200 years. In the siege of Vienna, September 23 to October 13, 1329, the Christians almost lost. The Christians had 17,000 men, the Turks 80,000. Weeks of rain preceded the attack, forcing the Turks to leave their heavy siege guns behind. They couldn't pull their heavy guns through the mud.
Had the Christians lost that battle, we would all be under Moslem rule today. There was nothing or no one else to stop them.

This 1200 plus years war was won by Christians in 1918. Apparently they did not have enough sense to let things alone and promptly began meddling in the Middle East on a regular basis, from creating Arab nation-states to starting wars over oil.
History teaches us that this might not have been a good idea.

On November 8, 1620 15,000 Protestants were defeated by 25,000 Catholics at the White Mountain. Casualties for the Catholics were light. The Protestants lost 5,000 men.

Instead of letting well-enough alone after such a decisive victory, the German Emperor began hunting down and exterminating his own Protestant subjects. Those subjects fled into Sweden. The Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus, attacked south. What should have ended in 1620 ended in 1648 and is now known as the Thirty Years War.

P&M Welcomes Michael H. Brown

Tue, 01 Aug 2006 02:52:48 GMT

July 31st, 2006 7:34PM Pacific Time
Author Michael Brown joins P&M as a Legal Columnist. His work was first seen at P&M on our Feature Articles Page at:
http://www.Articles.PowersAndMorrison.com

Michael's main site is located at:
http://www.MichaelHBrown.com

We hope that you can gain empowering knowledge from his articles, on your rights as a United States Citizen, and how you can help fight to protect them. If you are a lawyer, or studying the profession, this is the Column for you.

-Morrison

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